Writing in Tom Paine, Pat Lang and Ray McGovern, demonstrate that at least retired intelligence officers from the DIA and CIA, respectively, can cooperate in the nation’s best interest. In this case they point out the minimal upside and appalling downside risks inherrent in the Decider’s forthcoming policy of “surging” and additional 20K or 30K additional combat troops and Marines in Iraq:
Judging from President Bush’s behavior in recent weeks, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he may be no more stable than Nicholas II. And if retired Col. Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s top aide at the State Department, is right in saying that Bush still has the “vice president whispering in his ear every moment,†we have an unhappy but apt historical analogy.
But, you protest, the generals most intimately involved in Iraq, John Abizaid and George Casey, and Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker have made no secret of their strong reservations about sending large numbers of additional troops. That is correct, but also irrelevant. Because, as was the case in the Vietnam War, our top generals have long since morphed into careerists and politicians. They have become accustomed to looking up for the next reward—and not down at the troops who bear the brunt of their acquiescence in political/military decisions that make no sense.
. . .
What Gates may not realize, but the generals should, is that once an “all or nothing†offensive like the “surge†contemplated has begun, there is no turning back. It will be “victory†over the insurgents and the Shia militias or palpable defeat, recognizable by all in Iraq and across the world.
Stalingrad on the Tigris
A “surge†of the size possible under current constraints on U.S. forces will not turn the tide in the guerrilla war. Reinforcement of Bagdad several thousand U.S. troops last summer simply brought on more violence. Those who believe still more troops will bring “victory†are living in a dangerous dream world and need to wake up.
Moreover, major reinforcement would commit the US Army and Marine Corps to decisive combat in which there are no more strategic reserves to be sent to the front. It will be a matter of win or die in the attempt. In that situation, everyone in uniform on the ground will commit every ounce of their being to a hope of “victory,†and few measures will be shrunk from.
Analogies come to mind: the Bulge, Stalingrad, the Battle of Algiers. It will be total war with all the likelihood of excesses and mass casualties that come with total war.
. . .
Yesterday, when George Stephanopoulos asked [Oregon Senator Gordon] Smith what he meant by “criminal,†he replied:
“I said it. You can use any adjective you want, George. But I have long believed in a military context, when you do the same thing over and over again, without a clear strategy for victory, at the expense of your young people in arms, that is dereliction. That is deeply immoral.â€
If adopted, the “surge†strategy will be even worse than that. It will be something we will spend a generation living down.
Avoiding a national security disaster may well depend on whether Senator Smith’s sentiments begin to seriously penetrate the skulls of a couple of dozen of his party colleagues in the Upper House, that is enough to make an impeachment conviction vote possible. I can always hope, but I’m not optimistic.